What is knowledge? How do I know when I know something? That seems a straight forward question. I know my address, the name of my children, and the current year.
Simple.
But the question can quickly grow more complex. How do I know about the Civil War? I have read about it. But I also have read about UFOs, about ghosts, and about ancient Mayan gods. So while I might have a certain confidence in the existence of the Civil War of the United States, I might view with skepticism UFOs, ghosts and Mayan gods.
Thus, the existence of many written words about a subject does not provide a clear basis for knowing that I know something. My knowing that I know something involves a justification for that knowledge.
This brings us to what philosophers offer as a traditional, precise definition of knowledge, namely that knowledge is justified, true belief. In this definition, I know something if 1) it is indeed true, 2) I actually belief it to be true and 3) I have a justification for believing that it is true.
So, while I might believe in a God, and feel justified in that belief based on my prayer, study and personal experiences, a philosopher might not say I have knowledge, since significant questions may exist as to whether God does in fact exist.
Similarly, I might believe in UFOs, and UFOs might really exist, but I might think I know that UFOs exist based on blurry pictures of lights in the night sky. Thus many may say I am not justified in my belief.
What might proper knowledge look like? Let’s say on your vacation you visited the Washington monument in Washington D.C. Upon your return you told me that 1) you visited a famous monument in the Capital city of the United States, 2) the monument had the same name as the city and 3) the monument was shaped like a tall obelisk.
Even without your explicitly telling me, I would (most likely) have knowledge, in the philosophical sense, that you visited the Washington monument near the ellipse in Washington, D.C. I would say that based on my meeting the definition of knowledge, as follows:
- It is true you visited the Washington Monument.
- I believe you visited the Washington Monument.
- Since I know the capital of the US is Washington, D.C., and that the Washington monument is shaped like an obelisk, I would be justified in my belief.
With that discussion in place, we now turn to the Gettier problem. Admittedly, the Gettier problem involves nuances, but the problem presents a sufficient quandary to be of interest to the casual thinker.
Consider the following situation. (Note this is not the original example posed by Gettier in 1963. However, it fits within the class of Gettier-type examples). Sedgwick at the office shows me a Canadian quarter, and wonders what to do with it. I tell him to use it to buy his usual coffee from the coffee club (which I run), since the bank will take the quarter. Later, I see a serving of Mocha Dark, Sedgwick’s normal coffee, is gone, and a Canadian quarter is in the coffer club jar. I conclude Sedgwick bought coffee that morning.
However, unknown to me, Sedgwick was called out of the office, and picked up coffee at the corner store. In the office, George overhead the discussion, had a Canadian quarter, and used it to purchase coffee from the coffer club.
Does my statement that Sedgwick bough coffee represent knowledge? It would appear so by our definition. It is true Sedgwick bought coffee; I believe Sedgwick bought coffee; and I have a justification, i.e. Sedgwick had a Canadian quarter, I told Sedgwick to buy coffee with it, and there is a Canadian quarter in the coffee club jar.
